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THE WAR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RELIGION 
By Srdjan Vrcan 
Dr. Srdjan Vrcan is a professor emeritus of the Law School of University of 
Split in Croatia. He is a former dean of the school and his specialty is sociology of 
religion. He has attended numerous conferences and is widely published in the field 
of Eastern European religious developments. During the last few years his articles 
on the war in the former Yugoslavia were published in Italy, France, and Great 
Britain. This article was first published in Religion, State, and Society, Vol. 22, No. 
4 (1994), pp. 367-378 and is being reprinted with the permission of the author and 
the publisher. 
I. 
It is a legitimate, intriguing and urgent challenge to contemporary sociological research 
to enquire into the role of religion in the Yugoslav crisis. The question involves more than 
simply the relationship between the religion and war: it involves the earlier and wider 
question of the role of religion in deepening social divisions and cleavages until they reach 
the point of fracture and in exacerbating social conflicts until they reach maximum 
incandescence. It also involves the question of the relationship of religious confessions to 
each other, and the otherness of the others, in an area with mixed population, 
multiconfessional, multinational and multicultural. 
Two fundamental a priori objections may of course be made to asking the question at all. 
Firstly, some will point out that the war has been characterized as a religious one by the 
propaganda apparatus of one or other of the conflicting parties with the purely 
propagandistic aim of concealing the real nature of the war and creating (at least) confusion 
in international public opinion. It is more or less obvious, however, that this war has not 
been a religious war. It is evidently a political war, caused by political strategies which since 
the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis have been on a collision course. It is a war which fully 
confirms the well-known formula of Klausewitz that war is but a continuation of politics by 
other means. However, this does not mean that religion has nothing to do with the war. It 
is also more or less obvious that the three major confessions of the region, Catholicism, 
Orthodoxy and Islam, have all been implicated and involved in the conflict in some way and 
to some degree. Here we see an analogy with the civil war in Lebanon and the chronic 
conflict in Northern Ireland. In both these cases the wars have not been 'religious' in terms 
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of the classical definition of a 'holy war'; 1 but at the same time it has been obvious that 
religion has not been a purely passive onlooker but has been actively engaged in the conflict. 
Consequently at an impressionistic level the assertions of F. Vreg sound a convincing note: 
Amongst the demons of destruction of the processes of cultural rapprochement 
in the European area have been not only growing ethnicism, which frequently turns 
into the malignant tumor of nationalism, but also religious mysticism. We have seen 
a brutal eruption not only of national feelings with their political symbols, but of 
religious feelings and symbols too, and this has been wrongly understood as a 
religious rebirth. Croatian soldiers wear not only HDZ badges, but Catholic crosses 
too; Serbian soldiers do not carry photographs of Milosevic but Orthodox crosses. 
Muslim fundamentalists and mujaheddins kill under the slogan of Allah. In the 
former Yugoslav area, then, 'new' frontiers are being established between Catholics, 
Orthodox and Muslims. 2 
There is no doubt that religious symbolism has for some obviously relevant reasons been 
widely and deliberately used in the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslav area. 
Secondly, it is possible to dismiss the whole question with the argument that the war in 
former Yugoslavia is purely accidental ·in origin, or that it is an essentially anomalous 
phenomenon with no symptomatic value and therefore not deserving of any kind of 
sociological investigation at all. This argument hardly stands up to scrutiny, however. It is 
more plausible to maintain that the war is the inevitable result of a dominant political logic 
which has been in operation for some time. We ought also to remember that current 
developments in former Yugoslavia can hardly be interpreted as constituting a radical novelty 
of events which have never happened before. It is not surprising that Ernest Gellner's 
descriptions of the situation in some parts of Eastern Europe formulated in the early 1980s 
are valid for the developments in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. It has turned out to 
be true that obedience to the nationalist imperative must "involve population exchanges or 
expulsions, more or less forcible assimilation, and sometimes liquidation, in order to attain 
that close relation between the state and culture which is the essence of nationalism."3 We 
also need to bear in mind that the war in former Yugoslavia is not the only war of its kind. 
In 1992 most of the 30 or more wars being .waged around the world were of a tribal, racial, 
1
"The term 'holy war' has been, and is, applied to wars which God is believed to be in some way 
involved in the contest. Holy wars appear as wars which have been commanded. Their legitimacy 
does not allow any debate: a holy war must lead to the total elimination of the opponent, who is the 
enemy of God himself. .. A holy war is not only a just war; it is more than a necessary evil which 
ought to be limited; it is a positive good; it contributes to the accomplishment of God's kingdom; it 
executes God's will." J. Touscoz. "Laguerre juste: guelques remarques sur les doctrines du judaisme, 
du catholicism et du !'islam," in M. Torrelli(ed.), Religion et Guerres (Mami, Nice, 1992), p. 93. 
2F. Vreg, "Iluzije o evropskem multikuturalizmu," Teori ja in praska, vol. 30, nos 7-8, 1993, p. 
664. 
3 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 101. 
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ethnic and/or religious character.4 Some religious thinkers have been taking up the general 
challenge of the problem of religion and war. Thus Torrelli asks: "As it emerges from 
patriotic wars and wars generated by the clash of two ideological messianisms, is the world 
going to be engulfed by new religious wars?"5 It is very difficult, then, to argue that the war 
in former Yugoslavia is a totally anomalous phenomenon. Just the contrary: it may 
reasonably be claimed that this is a war with a high symptomatic value if, for instance, C. 
Offe is right in his diagnosis of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe to the effect that 
"there the scene is dominated by territorial disputes, migration~, minority or nationality 
conflicts, and corresponding secessionist longings."6 At the same time, it is permissible to 
connect the events in former Yugoslavia, which have Jed to a war in which religion plays a 
visible role, with some developments and changes of a wider extent. "As the world becomes 
increasingly interdependent," writes Kokosalakis, 
and as the utopianism of modernity becomes explicit; ethnic struggles and the 
assertion of identities become a prominent feature of the contemporary world. 
Religion at large is inextricably involved in this process almost everywhere and 
exemplifies the very tensions which are inherent in the matrix of universalism and 
localism.7 · 
The developments in former Yugoslavia may be interpreted as constituting an extreme 
case of tensions which exist elsewhere. In stimulating analysis, Patrick Michel insists that 'all 
have to manage the end of a polarity of ultimate references, which have been structuring not 
only people's behavior but also their mentality,' and that the problems of relationship 
between particular and universal are today of a crucial urgency.8 
Some would argue that this war ought to be projected· onto the background of the 
problem of the affirmation of identities and differences and also of their relation to others 
and to otherness. In this respect, the war in former Yugoslavia may be taken as an extreme 
case in which the affirmation of identities has turned into a practical denial of the possibility 
of living together peacefully and on a basis of equality with others and their otherness, as 
4B. Barber; "Dtihad protiv McWorld," Teori ja in praksa, vol. 29, nos. 9-10, 1992, p. 843. 
5M. Torrelli, "Introduction," Religion et Guerres, p. 9. 
6C. Offe, "Capitalism by democratic design? Democratic theory facing the triple transition in 
East Central Europe," Social Research, vol. 58, no. 4, 1991, p. 869. 
7N. Kokosalakis, "The historical continuity and cultural specificity of Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity," in Conferenza Internazionale su "Religions sans frontieres?' Tendeze presenti e future 
di migrazione. cultura e comunicazione (Rome: Universita degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza,' 1993), 
p. 94. . 
8P. Michel, "Pour une sociologie des itineraires de sens: une lecture politique du rapport entre 
croire et institution," Archives de sciences sociales des religiones, vol. 82, 1993, pp. 223-38. 
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well as an extreme case in which, as Kalscheuer has recently underlined, religious memories 
and identities have become motives for their bloody self -affirmation.9 
II. 
There are at least three major lines of argument which emphasize the specific features 
of the war in former Yugoslavia and legitimize our enquiry into the role of religion in the 
crisis. 
The first line of argument proceeds from a series of undeniable facts. It is fact that it 
is largely religious believers and members of various confessions who have been killing each 
other, who have been destroying each other's homes and churches, who have been driving 
each other from their towns and villages. Without their engagement on a mass scale, there 
would be no war, or at least the war would have been shorter and more confined. It is also 
true that when religion is important to people it is religion which defines the actual battle-
lines.10 To some degree this has been confirmed by the events in former Yugoslavia. 
Another undeniable fact is that the combatants on all sides have made extensive use of 
religious symbols as the most appropriate to indicate their identities and to demonstrate the 
aims they have been fighting for; and religious symbols have also been the best means of 
identifying legitimate targets for destruction. There can hardly be any doubt that the war 
has so far been waged in a context of increasing rather than decreasing the conflict potential 
of the basic confrontation. Conflicts between religious and national groups frequently attain 
extraordinary vehemenc~ and are the most difficult to abate.11 
It is, furthermore, an evident fact that the war has so far had some very im.portant 
consequences for the religious confessions in former Yugoslavia. First of all, there is no 
doubt that the war has made important changes to the map of the whole area and will 
continue to do so. It would be naive to believe that these changes will affect only the 
political map of the area, and will be confined to a redrawing of the borders of the new 
states. In fact, as the conflicts have become totalized and radicalized, they have been 
changing all kinds of maps: social, political, demographic, economic, cultural and 
confessional; even the maps of people's everyday lives. One may therefore predict with 
90. Kallscheur, So All European Roads Lead to (West) Rome, (Vienna: Iristitut fur Wissenchaften 
vom Menshen, 1993), p. 8. 
10J. Coleman, "Social cleavages and religious conflicts," The Journal of Social Issues, no. 12, 
19S6, p. 46. 
111bid. 
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certainty that the confessional map of the area which will ultimately emerge will certainly 
be very different from the previous one. 
Secondly, there have been very important changes in the social position of the various 
confessions within the various institutional frameworks in the area. The churches and 
religions have moved from an essentially extrasystemic or even countersystemic position to 
occupy a systemic or suprasystemic position; religion is now the overarc~ing systemic cultural 
and symbolic aggregate. 
Thirdly, there have been important changes in the very content of the operative religious 
confessions. It is obvious that ecumenical dialogue initiatives have been declining 
everywhere and in some places have completely ceased; that the balance between universalism 
and particularism within the different confessional cultures has been radically changing; and 
that some features of the various religions which were previously of marginal or secondary 
relevance have become more prominent: the theme of sacrifice, for instance, becoming so 
important in the current confessional interpretations of history, as martyrology in Serbian 
Orthodoxy, as a kind of Calvary in Croatian Catholicism and as a historical holocaust among 
the Bosnian Muslims. 
Fourthly, there have been profound changes in the relations be.tween the various, 
confessions: almost everywhere they have deteriorated. 
Fifthly, there have been important changes in the external, polit~cal, cultural and 
ideological conditions under which the various confessions operate in the everyday life of 
society in the various regions of former Yugoslavia. The collapse of all previously existing 
systemic restrictions led to the affirmation of religious freedom on an abstract level; but this 
has now been followed by new restrictions and oppressive practices against particular 
confessions in different parts of the country. As so often in history, the proclamation o( 
religious freedom has not been universal but very selective, increasing the freedom of some 
but restricting the freedom of others. 12 
Finally, it is a fact that since the mid-1980s the predominant political strategies in 
Central and Eastern Europe have been orientated towards the aim articulated by Mazzini in 
the nineteenth century of 'one nation one state.' In former Yugoslavia these strategies have 
obtained religious legitimacy, withheld for a time only by Bosnian Islam and more recently 
by part of Croatian Catholicism in Bosnia. The Mazzinian political formula is very close to 
the Old Testament formula of 'one God, one nation and one Iand.' 13 
12E. Poulat, Liberte. laicite (Paris: du Cerf. Cujas, 1987). As a: credible witness may be taken 
Sevko Omerpasic, the head of the Islamic community for Croatia and Slovenia. See his interview in 
Feral Tribune (Split), 23 September I 993, p. 3. ·· 
13J.L. Piveteau, "L' Ancien Testament a-t-il contribue a Ia territorialisation de Ia Suisse?" Social 
Compass, vol. 40, no. 2, 1993, p. 169. 
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The second line of argument is historico-situationally specific. 
Firstly, it is obvious, but needs stressing, that the war in former Yugoslavia is a very 
peculiar contemporary war. It is being waged not in some distant part of Asia, Africa or 
latin America but on European soil, close to the very heart of Europe, an hour by air from 
major European cities. 
Secondly, it is obvious, but needs stressing, that the confessions implicated and engaged 
in the war are not strange pagan religions or extremist fanatical sects, but well-established 
and respectable world religions: Christianity in its Catholic and Orthodox versions has shaped 
European history and Islam has existed on European soil for centuries. Those involved are 
believers in god in general and in God and Christ in particular. 
Thirdly, we should note that this war has another peculiarity. It is a war not between 
opposing states with more or less delineated frontiers and more or less regular armies, but a 
war being waged and presented as one between nations as collective entities,· involving in a 
total manner all individuals belonging to those nations and disregarding any other identities 
they may possess. It is a war which has been depicted and publicly legitimized as a 
confrontation between presumably irreconcilable types of human culture and civilization; and 
in the final analysis, as a legitimate confrontation of totally incompatible worlds. It is a war, 
therefore, into which the principle of collective responsibility as opposed to that of personal 
responsibility has been introduced; and this principle has legitimized the elimination of all 
distinctions been introduced; and this principle has legitimized the elimination of all 
distinctions between military and civilians, between armed and unarmed, between men and 
women, between adults and children. It has moreover become legitimate to resort to 
retaliation on a mass scale as a normal way of waging the war, and to treat all persons and 
objects identified by a specific national sign as hostile and as legitimate targets. With this 
aspect of the war being daily underlined by the mass media and the politicians it is not 
surprising that thousands of people have been murdered, that thousands of houses have been 
demolished or plundered in regions where no shot has ever been fired, that numerous 
churches and devotional objects have been destroyed in places otherwise untouched by war 
operations, that hundreds of thousands of people have been driven from their home, that 
thousands of unarmed civilians have been arrested as potential enemies and sent to 
concentration camps. 
Fourthly, another particular feature of the war is that it is not being waged between total 
strangers against unknown intruders from far away, but between people who yesterday were 
acquaintances, neighbors, colleagues, friends. Furthermore, the weapons being used are not 
examples of contemporary high technology that kill and destroy at a distance: it is more 
similar to traditional wars which require an emotional commitment on the part of the 
combatants and their supporters. It is war, therefore, which feeds on overheated hatred, and 
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its needs the permanent production and reproduction of hatred on a mass scale as its main 
spiritual fuel. In this sense it is war as not simply instruments of politics but as signs of 
identity, expressions of community, ends in themselves.14 As Torrelli notes, describing 
modern wars: 
The enemy is the central notion; the war is being waged against him; but in 
modern wars, in ideological wars, in civil wars the enemy becomes a human type to 
destroy: he is to be 'converted'. or must disappear; this is a new war between 
'believers' and 'heretics'. True religious wars have always been manichaean wars in 
which the enemy has been satanized.15 
There is thus no way of avoiding the difficult subject of the role of religion in the 
production and reproduction of hatred on a mass scale. 
Finally, we must take account of the fact that war is being waged in Europe, in an area 
that may reasonably be considered, for historical and cultural reasons, as almost the ideal 
field for practicing interconfessional dialogue and ecumenism and almost the ideal field for 
practicing interconfessional dialogue and ecumenism and working towards multiculturality, 
multiconfessionality and multinationality as a viable way of life for present and future. The 
fact is, however, that publicly proclaimed willingness for interconfessional dialogue and 
ecumenism has not been able to resist increasing social division and conflict. The religious 
problem is not a failure to agree on theological interpretation of the filioque, or on celibacy, 
or on the question of women priests or on papal primacy; the problem is a failure to live 
together in conditions of normality and equality. Interconfessional dialogue and ecumenism 
seem to belong to history. Never before, except during the Second World War in some 
regions, has the idea that 'it is possible to live together with these others' obtained more 
support or higher legitimacy. Never before has a multinational, multicultural and 
multiconfessional community been not only declared inviable but stigmatized also as 
something unnatural, against nature. 
The third line of argument to demonstrate the legitimacy of an exploration of the role 
of religion in the war in former Yugoslavia is predominantly theoretical. 
Firstly, the war provides an opportunity for a reexamination of some of Max Weber's 
ideas and more particularly of their contemporary relevance. I am referring mainly to 
Weber's idea that an unavoidable polytheism, an irreducible pluralism of gods, or ultimate 
values, leads inevitably to irreconcilable antagonism as the distinctive feature of the human 
condition as such. According to A. Giddens, commenting on Weber's ideas, the war in 
former Yugoslavia seems to suggest that behind ultimate values stands nothing but force, that 
irreconcilable cultures are defended by conflicting states operating from the home of their 
14Barber, op. cit., p. 843. 
15Torreli, op. cit., p. 23. 
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power. 16 Have Weber's ideas been superseded by modern history? Are they out dated, or 
have they preserved their theoretical relevance for the contemporary sociology of religion? 
We should remember particularly Weber's warning that in the modern age the old gods might 
well rise again from their tombs and engage once again in their old eternal struggles, leaving 
to people only the possibility of aligning themselves with one or the other. 
Secondly, as Weber did, we should examine the relationship between the religious ethics 
of human universal brotherliness/sisterliness and politics. Weber concluded that there is an 
acute tension between the two, which is always connected with power and violence, either 
manifest or latentP It seems now, in light of recent experience, that this relationship is 
more complex and more ambivalent. One ought to remember Hobsbawm's thesis that 
Christianity has been the most fertile greenhouse for universal but competing ideas.18 
Frequently, the acute tension noted by Weber either does not exist, or is easily circumvented, 
particularly when integral nationalism enters on the scene.19 At least it seems that the 
otherness of the 'others', with their specific traits, for all practical purposes outside the field 
otherwise covered by universal human brotherliness. That this is so could, of course, best 
·be demonstrated by an analysis of public reaction to war crimes and misdeeds committed 
against others by their own side. 
Thirdly, we should take note of an interesting set of problems regarding the process of 
transition to which Patrick Michel draws our attention. Discourse on the transition 
presupposes that the point of departure of the transition as well as the point of arrival have 
been clearly identified, which is not the case. Michel discusses the role of communism in the 
development of modern society. On the one hand, there is the common view in the Catholic 
Church that the Soviet system was the last incarnation of modernity, the last caricature by 
those who would construct a world without God and the ultimate bastard offspring of the 
Enlightenment, and that consequently the fall of communism represents the victory of the 
church over. modernity. On the other hand, there is an interpretation of the fall of 
communism which sees communism as a failed attempt to retard a continuous and global 
process of disenchantment by substituting a political modality of believing for a religious 
16A. Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 185. 
17H. H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology(New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), pp. 333-335. 
18Eric Hobsbawn, Naci je i nacionalizam (Zagreb: Liber, 1992), p. 71. 
19The term 'integral nationalism' is taken from J. Schwarzmantel, who writes that "traditional or 
"integral nationalism" has invoked an idea of "one nation, one state", where the nation has been 
claimed to be totally culturally united, as having supposedly homogeneous character." J. 
Schwarzmantel, "Nation versus class: nationalism and socialism in theory and practice" in J. 
Oakley(ed.). The Social Origin of Nationalist Movements (London: Sage, 1992), p. 57. 
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modality: the fall of Communism is thus a further stage in the process of global 
disenchantment - this time, disenchantment with sacralized politics. According to the latter 
interpretation, the primary function of religion in the transition from Communism has been 
to compel politics to limit and desacralize itself. Consequently, there are two distinct 
processes in operation. The first has been inducing the political reinstrumentalization of 
religion, which thus becomes one of the reference points for politics and regularly questions 
the categories of pluralism and therefore of democracy. The second process is longterm, it 
involves a threefold phenomenon of individualization, differentiation and rationalization, and 
it induces the loss of social relevance of religion. In the final analysis, those who appeal to 
ultimate and absolute references are facing the champions of democratic politics which, 
because it operates in conditions of pluralism, has by definition to be located in the relative. 
After the failure of Communism, with its ultimate references, sacralized and absolutized, the 
choice seems to be between politics with ultimate religious references, excluding pluralism 
(at least at the highest level), and politics with no ultimate references at all, no sacred 
absolutes, and hence coherently pluralist. Put in the simplest of terms, the choice is between 
politics in a reenchanted and reenchanting world, and politics in a disenchanted and 
disenchanting world. The consequences of this disjunction are certainly very interesting to 
examine. 20 The role of religion in the Yugoslav crisis should shed some light on the 
relationship between war and these two alternative types of postcommunist politics. 
III. 
There is no need to develop a lengthy argument to show that the major confessions have 
played an important role in sharpening social divisions and in intensifying social conflict or 
to demonstrate their involvement in various ways in the war that has broken out. It is, 
however, important to explore the reasons for this role and involvement. To quote N. 
Kokosalakis: 
In what was Yugoslavia, of course, the claims for autonomy of the new 
Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, etc., and the resultant violent conflicts, 
are all underpinned by different ethno-religious boundaries between Catholics, 
Orthodox and Moslems. Now it hardly needs emphasizing that these ethnoreligious 
identities are immediately connected with the social and political struggles of these 
people to acquire statehood and a place in a world of scarcity and hard economic 
realities. Religious conservatism in these circumstances tends to promote radicalism 
and violent conflict. 21 
20M" hI . !C e , OP. Cit. 
21 N. Kokosalakis, "Religion and the Dynamics of Social Change in Contemporary Europe," 
Archives de sciences sociales des religiones, no. 81, 1993, p. 145. 
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The involvement of the major religious confessions in the war has developed on the basis 
of the confessional legitimacy previously given to the dominant political strategies. The 
religious confessions have been variously involved with political strategies in three contexts: 
firstly, in bringing about the demolition of the atheistic state with the elimination of all 
previously existing restrictions and institutional pressures on religion and ecclesial 
organizations and securing complete religious freedom; secondly, in securing independent 
national states in a complex region where the application of the right to self -determination 
must disclose the 'chameleonic' nature of this right;22 and thirdly, in accomplishing radical 
and rapid transition involving a set of political, economic, ideological and cultural shock 
therapies. 
Conferring confessional legitimacy on such political strategies in general is, however, 
different from conferring it on war. To qualify as 'just', a war must traditionally fulfill a 
number of crucial requirements, including the following: (a) war should be a last resort when 
all other means have been exhausted; (b) war should clearly be an act of redress of rights 
actually violated or defense against unjust demands backed by the threat of force; (c) war 
must be openly and legally declared by properly constituted governments; (d) there must be 
a reasonable prospect of victory; (e) the means must be appropriate to the ends; (f) the war 
must be waged in such a way as to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants; (g) 
the victorious nation must not require the utter humiliation of the vanquished. All the major 
confessions involved in the war in former Yugoslavia have effectively invoked this same 
doctrine to legitimate their support for the different and opposed political strategies that have 
led to the war and consequently for their support for the opposed sides in the war. It should 
also be noted that the doctrine of 'just war' is being invoked at a time when at least come 
Christian thinkers have been seriously questioning and revising that doctrine. 23 It is also 
clear that there are no indications that serious consideration has ever been given to 
observations such as Reinhold Niebuhr's warning that the Christian faith "ought to persuade 
us that political controversies are always conflicts between sinners and not between righteous 
men and sinne·rs: It ought to mitigate the self -righteousness which is inevitably concomitant 
to all human conflict."24 Finally, it is also important to take into account the generally 
disregarded possibility that the irony of history may be at work today in the process of 
22The term is taken from B. Neuberger, "Samoodlocba narodov-konceptulne dileme," Nova revi ja, 
vol. 13, nos 141-2, 1994, p. 157. 
23See, for instance G. Labouerie, "A propos de guerre juste', in Religion et Guerres, p. 110. He 
insists that "there are no just wars, there are inevitable wars, wars connected with our freedom and 
its practice." ·He refers to the Vatican II assertion that "war must never be regarded as a means of 
establishing justice among all peoples" (ibid., p. 243). 
24Quoted in J.B. Elsshtan, Women and War (Boston: Basic Books, 1987}, p. 187. 
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transition in this area, as it has been before, involving the possibility of perverse effects of 
otherwise commendable social actions. 25 It is thus a legitimate exercise to look more closely 
at the reasons which have motivated and facilitated confessional options for opposed political 
strategies, providing religious legitimacy for such strategies and contributing to a more or less 
total mobilization of confessional resources for political purposes. 
Lying behind this phenomenon is a complex process involving the parallel politicalization 
of religion and the religionization of politics, described by R. Robertson as a trend of world 
dimensions. 26 
Despite occasional criticism and partial dissent, the politicalization of religion has been 
proceeding steadily in official political circles. It may be detected primarily in a· visible 
political instrumentalization of religion and in a religious instrumentalization of politics. The 
former involves a visible process of mobilization of all the resources at disposal, including 
confessional resources, for political purposes in a situation of increasing social conflict. In 
fact, none of the dominant political strategies that have led to the war had a realistic chance 
of success without an extended mobilization of the various existing confessional resources or 
without obtaining at least some kind of legitimacy in superior religious terms. The latter 
involves a direct confessional intervention in politics, without which there is no realistic 
likelihood of a religious recconquista of secularized society. This has required the 
affirmation of each particular confession as the primary legitimating institution, which is 
able to create and recreate stable loyalty on a mass scale to emerging social and political 
systems. 
The political mobilization of confessional resources has been brought about in two 
different ways, described by R. Robertson. 27 A particular religious confession will be 
favored as a result of ideological motives and for political purposes which are in themselves 
of a nonreligious and extrareligious nature; meanwhile a particular political programme will 
be chosen on the basis of strictly religious commitments and for purely religious motives. 
The parallel process of the religionization of politics has been going on in four different 
ways. The process consist essentially in a tendency to present crucial political concepts as 
_ meriting total adherence and unconditional and overheated veneration, in substance religious 
or parareligious. 
The most important aspects of this process have been the following. 
25R. Boudon, II posto del disordine (Bologna: il Mulino, 1985), p. 258. 
26R. Robetson, "Globalization, politics, and religion," in J. Beckford and T. Luckman (eds.), The 
Changing Face of Religion (London: Sage, 1989), p. 12. 
27Ibid., p. 19. 
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I. A systematic and permanent inclination to lend essentially religious attributes and 
connotations to some key political concepts in everyday usage, even if these are of secular 
origin, with the evident intention of increasing their non-negotiable attraction and 
intensifying their emotional charge as well as protecting them by explicit sacralization from 
possible political critique and immunizing them from public dissent. In this way they are 
given an ultimate political legitimacy of essentially numinous nature as in political discourse 
about 'sacred Croatia,' 'sacred Serbia,' 'celestial Serbia,' 'sacred untouchable frontiers,' 'sacred 
will of the nation,' 'sacred history of the fatherland,' and so on. 
2 . The ontologizing of existing social, political and cultural differences, projecting them 
on to a metaphysical backdrop. By this means political conflicts are transformed into 
conflicts, as it were, sub specie aeternitatis; they are presented as conflicts between different 
and opposed human types, between irreconcilable cultures, between antagonistic types of 
civilization. The possibility of normal and peaceful coexistence is thus reduced and the 
acceptable price to be paid for conflict and war is raised. 
3. A pervading and systematic manichaeanism is applied to current conflicts, and this leads 
to one of the opposed parties being portrayed as an angelic personification of Good and the 
other as a diabolic incarnation of Evil. The tendency to depict the two sides as God's and 
Satan's goes against Weber's expectation that the introduction of God's name into violent 
political conflicts will be experienced by believers as blasphemy. 28 
4. An interpretation of national history in terms of a sacred martyrology of Calvary made 
glorious by the quality and quantity of the suffering of the victims that has to be 
recompensed or revenged in terms of a privileged quasi- salvational historical mission within 
the eternal plans of Providence, or in terms of a historical dedication of the nation chosen 
in advance by Heaven in a non-negotiable manner and committed to the celestial cause and 
spiritual values. 
5. The nations involved are eternalized in terms of some kind of Urvolk and in terms of 
their fundamental allegedly suprahistorical immutable qualities. 
6. A constant resort in official interpretations of recent political events to a theory of 
diabolic conspiracy (involving Masons, Jews, the Comintern, the Vatican) against this or that 
nation. 
The end result of this kind of religionization of politics can be described as the 
absolutization and sacralization of some otherwise controversial political goals or, in Michel's 
terminology, the reintroduction into poiitics of ultimate references; the reenchantment of 
politics. The process is of a structural nature and has social functions which can easily be 
28Gerth and Mills, op cit., p. 334. 
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detected. And it is hard to pretend, in the context of a critical sociological analysis, that such 
a process has nothing to do with religion. 
Behind this whole process lies a very specific concept of the nation which is prevalent 
in contemporary confessional cultures, Orthodox and Catholic and recently Islamic too. As 
Schnapper has noted, there are at least two different histories of the nation, two different 
ideas of the nation which have been permanently opposed to each other, and the histories 
of the construction of the nation and national ideologies have been different in the eastern 
and western parts of Europe. "In various terms theorists of the nation have opposed the 
nation of Western Europe--civic, voluntary, contractual--to the nation of Eastern Europe-
populist, organic, natural, ethnic. The Western European nation of citizens is opposed to the 
Eastern European nation of ancestors."29 
The Western European definition dates back to the French Revolution, and "defines the 
nation in non-ethnic terms. This concept of "nation citoyenne" is opposed to an ethnically-
based definition of the nation." The crucial element in this definition is "the idea of the 
nation as an association of citizens, each of whom possesses certain rights which should be 
guaranteed and safeguarded by the state." And this means that the nation is defined on the 
basis of "the idea of citizenship and a commitment to pluralism": the nation is not to be 
understood in terms of community which is ethnically and culturally homogeneous;30 it is at 
least in principle open to all who participate in the common political life. The Eastern 
European concept of the nation is more ethnic than political, and is based on the idea of 
exclusive adherence to a collective entity, characterized by cultural homogeneity, which tends 
to be closed. Political structures are deemed to derive from the Urllo!k, the preexisting 
historico-biological community, and the state is seen as the supreme, almost sacred, political 
incarnation of such a community and its Wesenwi!le, and not necessarily a state based on law 
and the democratically articulated political will of equal citizens, which is by definition 
negotiable and open to criticism and contestation as well as to rational and competent public 
discourse. This latter concept necessarily introduces a discriminatory distinction between 
citizens of the first order and citizens of the second order, according to their nationality, or 
between citizens and subjects, the former enjoying all rights of citizenship and the latter 
being denied some of these basic rights. 31 
290. Schnapper, "Les sens de l'ethnico-religiuex," Archives des sciences sociales des religions, 
no. 81, 1993, p. 155. 
30Schwarzmantel, Joe. cit. 
31 J. Habermas has pointed to tensions existing between the generalization of human rights and 
nationalism, asserting that "the abstract generalised idea of democracy and human rights constitutes 
a solid point of reference upon which traditional national concepts--the language, literature, and 
history of one nation--break down.' J. Habermas, "Per una idea razionale di patria," Micromega, no. 
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Each of the main religions in former Yugoslavia is host to various traditions and cultural 
aggregates which can be used, and have been used, to stimulate and legitimate confessional 
options in support of political strategies in pursuit of the political ideal of 'one nation, one 
state, and only one state for each nation'--an ideal which can hardly be realized in this area 
without resort to violence. Some of these confessional traditions and cultural aggregates are 
as follows. 
I. There is a tradition which refers to an allegedly insoluble synthesis between the 
respective nationality and confession, insisting that a particular confession has been not just 
one of the important historical and cultural components of the nationality in question, but 
the constituent and constitutive nucleus of the very being of that nation as such. An element 
of transcendence and sacredness has thus been implanted into ~he national being itself. 
2. There is a traditional belief in the presumed convergence of the national state and its 
particular confession and church, a convergence which leads to the veneration of the national 
state as such, regardless of how it was established and the historical context in which it has 
developed, and above all regardless of the way it is organized and functions. In these 
circumstances, for a church to stay resolutely with its people means that it must also stay 
with resolutely with its national state and state politics. The notion of the sacredness of the 
state has been built into the very idea of the national state. 
3. There is a tradition which interprets national history as a sacred or quasisacred 
martyrology (in Serbian Orthodoxy) or Calvary (in Croatian Catholicism) of the respective 
nation; this is primarily the consequence of a deliberate historical dedication of the nation 
to religious beliefs and celestial values. In this way national history becomes desecularized. 
4. There is tradition which ascribes a specific historical role to a particular nation in the 
history of a particular confession. The nation is described as finding itself on a religious 
frontier, as acting historically as the guardian of this (western or eastern) religious frontier 
and constantly exposed to external threats. 
5. There is consequently a well-established tradition of a fundamental historical 
convergence between, on the one hand, the 'national cause'(Serbian or Croatian) and on the 
other hand, the 'religious cause'(Orthodox or Catholic) in the wider arena. And this tradition 
appears to be reinforced by conditions in the modern industrial world. If, as Ernest Gellner 
argues, the function of the nation state in the modern industrial world is essentially that of 
a necessary political roof over a common culture, then there is an important twofold 
consequence for the former Yugoslavia area: firstly, a particular region as a crucial element 
in a common shared culture requires by necessity a specific political national roof over it in 
an otherwise pluricultural and pluriconfessional region; and secondly, a state which claims 
3, 1987, p. 131. 
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to function as a political roof over a shared national culture in an otherwise pluricultural and 
pluriconfessional region must obtain an essentially religious legitimacy and generate the 
required cultural homogeneity in religious ·terms too. There is consequently a mutual 
reinforcement of two parallel absolutism: national and confessional. 
6. Finally, there is a tradition which regards those of a different confession as schismatics, 
heretics or infidels. This easily leads to the negative absolutization of confessional and 
national 'otherness' and lends a kind of superior legitimacy to political ideas which proclaim 
the impossibility of living together in a peaceful, democratic and durable way with those of 
different confessions and nationalities. 
In my view we must come to the conclusion that the war in former Yugoslavia is not a 
classical religious war of the type well known from history, but is nevertheless a war in 
which religion is deeply involved and consciously engaged. At the same time, the war has 
some of the characteristics of a war of faiths, if a war of faiths means a conflict of creed 
against creed ("croire contre croire," as Michel has put it32); b:ut the faiths involved represent 
a mixture of confessional and worldly components, including absolutizations, sacralizations 
and reenchantments. It has to be said that the course of events in the Yugoslav crisis has 
shown that the confessions operating in the area have been more able to divide than unite, 
to oppose than to conciliate, to inflame than to placate.33 
32Michel, op. cit., p. 228. 
3~In this respect we should take into account critical views such as those expressed by Barber 
(op. cit., p. 884) to the effect that whereas in the past such monotheistic faiths as Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, were characterized by an enlightened universalism, in their modern 
incarnations they tend to be parochial rather than cosmopolitan, fuelled by hatred rather than love, 
proselytic rather than ecumenical, fanatical rather than rational, secretarian rather than deistic, 
ethnocentric rather than universalist, with the result that as new forms of hypernationalism they are 
schismatic and secessionist, and never integrative. 
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